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ABSTRACT
The football transfermarket is a billion-pound industry, traditionally dominated by
the European market. This has been challenged by the rise of relatively new
markets emerging from China, Brazil, Turkey and Russia. Important countries
within the market, they also challenge the traditional status order. While classical
international trade theorists suggest that capital or resource advantage predicts
trade, economic sociologists argue that a world-systems perspective economic
relationships are a core component. Therefore, we analyse the football trade
network of these emerging markets to understand the structure, specifically in
relation to the world-systems perspective. Using social network analysis, we
identify the network is structured analogously to a world-systems perspective
with a core of European countries, a semi-periphery of developing countries and
a periphery containing countries where football is less developed. Furthermore,
Turkey and Brazil occupy structural holes acting as brokers between the core,
semi-periphery and periphery positions which can be advantageous.
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Within a world-systems perspective of trade,
there is a distinct division of labour that mani-
fests itself structurally through three layers, a
core, semi-periphery and periphery. The core
representing the elite economies (mostly
western), the periphery representing predomi-
nantly less developed, or global south countries
(Therien, 1999), with weak economies and gov-
ernments, and the semi-periphery compromis-
ing of more developed, often industrial
economies (Wallerstein, 2004). Indeed, a
world-systems approach to economic trans-
actions amongst countries has generated con-
siderable interest from a variety of different
commodity imports and exports (cf. Chase-
Dunn & Grimes, 1995; Massey et al., 1993;
Nemeth & Smith, 1985; Sarajlić, Malod-Dognin,
Yaveroğlu, & Pržulj, 2016; Zhang, 2017), yet
the global sports market has had limited atten-
tion. This is ironic, given that the global sports
market has been valued anywhere between
$700 billion and $1.5 trillion (Kearney, 2011;
Plunkett Research, 2017). Furthermore, whilst a
world-systems theory has well established
roots in the more sociologically led branch of
economics, the role of network theory (social
network analysis) has been given limited atten-
tion, with the exception of the exemplary work
by Snyder and Kick (1979), and Kick, McKinney,
McDonald, and Jorgenson (2011), even though
it is a central theory in the sub-disciplines of
economic sociology and economic geography.
Therefore, in this paper we add to the literature
by exploring trade in global football through a
world-systems perspective, adopting a social
network perspective to address how this trade
is structured, with a specific emphasis on foot-
balls emerging global markets, of China, Brazil,
Turkey and Russia, which we believe are chal-
lenging the assumed elite.
The “association football” (herein football)
market remains the largest sports market glob-
ally, estimated to account for 43% of the market
share (Kearney, 2011). Expenditure on players
represents the largest investment for firms
(clubs) in the market, with an estimated $4.79
billion spent in 2016 (FIFA, 2017a), and $6
billion in 2017 (FIFA, 2017b). There is consider-
able value in the global transfer market, which
cuts across national territories, with 15,290
trades (commonly referred to as a transfer)
taking place between January and October
2017 (FIFA, 2017b; up from 14,591 in 2016),
and whilst Europe is involved in a large pro-
portion of these trades, certain global emerging
markets are increasingly improving their pos-
ition. Indeed, one such country who is China,
who were aggressive in their spending, becom-
ing the leading nation in player expenditure for
the 16/17 winter transfer window, investing
£300 m, £100 m more than England (Deloitte,
2017). Given the significance of football to
nations, culturally and economically, and the
substantial flows of trade globally, football war-
rants academic attention, in similar ways to the
trade of precious metals, food, minerals and
other consumer products.
In its simplest form football’s “transfer
market” represents trade of services where
there are sets of buyers and sellers who
exchange money to acquire football players. As
Morrow (1996) notes, the player is not the
asset, the service they provide is and is thus the
traded commodity. Accordingly, in this paper,
we treat players and the service they provide
(termed football or talent resource) as an asset
being traded on the market. Indeed, this
“market” becomes more complex when includ-
ing the loan system (a form of cross-subsidisa-
tion whereby one club temporarily provides
talent resources to other clubs for a fixed
period-of-time) and free agents (players not con-
tracted to a club and therefore are not traded).
However, in this paper, we restrict the analysis
to considering only the flow of football services
from the selling to buying club aggregated to
nations, or essentially the flow of money
between countries trading in the footballing
commodity of players.
The buying and selling of footballing
resource, either domestically or internationally,
create a trade network at an individual club
level and, importantly for this paper, an aggre-
gated country level network. Unfortunately,
very little attention has been paid to this aggre-
gated networked model. Yet, over the last
decade, economic network research has
grown exponentially – mainly through the con-
tributions of Arthur (1999), Wilhite (2001),
Jackson (2010, 2014), Vega-Redondo (2007)
and Goyal (2012) (for an introduction on econ-
omic networks see Knoke, 2012). However,
network analysis is not commonplace within
economics. This probably reflects the main-
stream neo-classical economic foundations
upon which international trade theories were
developed. Under this tradition, various
assumptions are made, including: how actors,
whether individuals, firms or countries, make
rational choices to maximise utility/profits
within a budget constraint; perfect competition
within a market allows actors to have access to
complete information to make a utility/profit
maximising decisions that satisfy their self-inter-
est (Knoke, 2012; Simon, 1955). In doing so they
often reject the cultural, religious, political and
social relational implications economic sociol-
ogist’s Mark Granovetter (1985), Nan Lin (2002)
and others suggest are embedded in economic
activity. As such, trade from an economic socio-
logical perspective has focused on Immanuel
Wallerstien’s (1974a, 1974b) world-systems pos-
tulation, that trade relations with underdeve-
loped resource-rich countries are exploited by
the rich capital nations; creating a tripartite
trade network of the periphery; semi-periphery
and core. It is this approach that is of interest in
this paper.
With the exception of Liu, Liu, Lu, Wang, and
Wang (2016), football’s international trade
network remains under-researched. Indeed,
whilst Liu et al. (2016) provide insightful work
to build upon, Wallerstien’s world-systems
approach offers a stronger theoretical position
for which to explore the football trade system.
Therefore, this paper firstly aims to provide an
exploratory analysis of the football’s emerging
markets trade network (FEMTN) – made up of
China, Russia, Brazil and Turkey, and secondly
aims to identify if the world-systems postulation
holds true within the FEMTN, by answering the
following research questions;
(i) Which countries occupy powerful or influ-
ential positions with the FEMTN?
(ii) Does the FEMTN conform to the world-
systems perspective?
Trade and networks
International trade has long been a central
concern for disciplines of the social sciences,
especially within economics, sociology, politics
and international relations. In its simplest form,
it represents economic exchange across
country borders and until discipline-defining
work by Adam Smith ([1776] 1937 with Wealth
of Nations, it was considered mercantilist, advo-
cating nationalist protectionism. Since this mer-
cantilist era of the 16th, 17th and mid-18th
centuries, international trade theories have
transformed from Adam Smith’s absolute
advantage theory of free trade through division
of labour, to David Ricardo’s ([1817] 1951) com-
parative advantage of cost differentiation, later
refined and publicised by noteworthy authors,
namely, Mill, J.S. Mill, Marshall, Torrens,
Taussig, Haberler and Samuelson (cf. Aldrich,
2004; Chipman, 1965a, 1965b; Ruffin, 2005;
Thweatt, 1976). However, Ricardian theories of
international trade did not consider how differ-
entiation occurred, leading Heckscher (1919)
and Ohlin (1933) to extend the Ricardian
theory to account for “factor endowments”
with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (Ito,
Rotunno, & Vézina, 2017; Jones, 1956). These
theory states that capital rich counties export
capital-intensive goods and labour rich
countries export labour-intensive goods, with
both importing the alternate. Unfortunately,
the assumptions these theories are founded
upon, such as perfect competition and ubiqui-
tous technology, do not hold true. This is
especially the case at this point in the twenty-
first Century, where markets have monopolies
and oligopolies, and countries have different
technological advances.
To readjust this imbalance, several trade the-
orists have attempted to account for differen-
tiating technological advances; Posner’s (1961)
Imitation (Technology) Gap theory, and imper-
fect market competition (Brander & Krugman,
1983; Krugman, 1979), to name two. However,
much like previous models of international
trade, empirical models often fall short of theor-
etical and mathematical specifications. One
argument is that they fail to account for the rela-
tional elements (and their associated costs)
inherent in trade, something Kranton and Mine-
hart (2001) explored in their theory of the
Buyer–Seller network, but there remains a
serious underdevelopment and limitation in
the literature accounting for the relational
elements of economic activity. Indeed, within
(neo)-classical economics, the relations
between actors have been treated as a “fric-
tional drag” impeding competition within
markets (Granovetter, 1985, p. 484). Which is
surprising since Nobel prize-winner Ronald
Coase (1960) stated through his theory of trans-
action cost economics that it is the cost of
forming and maintaining beneficial relation-
ships that dominates decision-making.
That said, within the “complex systems” lit-
erature, the world economy often takes centre
stage cutting across multiple disciplines; such
as physics, computer science, economics,
finance and international business (Almog,
Squartini, & Garlaschelli, 2017; Bargigli & Galle-
gati, 2011; Baskaran, Blöchl, Brück, & Theis,
2011; Garlaschelli & Loffredo, 2004, 2005, 2007;
Fagiolo, Reyes, & Schiavo, 2009, 2010; Fronczak
& Fronczak, 2012; Kali & Reyes, 2007, 2010;
Maratea, Petrosino, & Manzo, 2016; Serrano &
Boguná, 2003; Squartini, Fagiolo,& Garlaschel-
li,2011a,2011b). Whilst these disciplines increase
our understanding of economic networks in
practice, they often omit the position and role
within networks which economic sociologists
are concerned with (Granovetter, 2005; Knoke,
2012; Lin, 2002).
World system theorists and, similarly, depen-
dency theorists, argue that position within the
global trade network is fundamental to econ-
omic development, given relationships and
power dynamics inherent in such systems
(Bornschier & Chase-Dunn, 1985; Frank, 1966).
Wallerstein (1974a, 1974b) extended the bipar-
tite Marxist-infused dependency theory of the
core developed rich capital nations exploiting
the resources of poor underdeveloped periph-
eral counties (Frank, 1966), coining the World-
systems theory (or the world-systems perspec-
tive). Wallerstein essentially stratified economic
development into three components or
trading blocks; a core, a semi-periphery and a
periphery (Wallerstein, 1974a, 1974b). This was
empirically supported by Snyder and Kick
(1979), who successfully block modelled 118
countries into a core (Western Europe, North
America, Japan, Australia and South Africa),
semi-periphery (Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
Cuba and Middle Eastern countries) and a per-
iphery (Africa, South America and Asian devel-
oping countries), whilst also accounting for
noneconomic relations impacting trade, such
as military, treaty membership and diplomatic
ties. However, Kick et al. (2011) returning to
this 1979 study, following the same economic
and noneconomic linkages and logic, found
similar results with three core trading blocks,
the centre core of US, UK, France, Germany,
Italy and Netherlands along with a Western
Europe block (which also included Brazil,
Turkey and Israel) and Asian block of China,
India and Japan along with Australia, Canada
and South Africa. With other blocks resembling
consistent (semi) periphery positions (South
America, Africa, former Soviet Union countries).
Whilst these studies offer an exemplary foun-
dation for the exploration of the network struc-
ture in global trading between nations, we can
further draw on academic literature within
economic sociology to further support these
studies. In particular, for this paper, we are inter-
ested in structural and relational embedded-
ness, as proposed by Granovetter (1985, 2017).
For Granovetter, all economic behaviour is
rooted and embedded in social relations, as
such decisions, be it buying a football player
or the trading of diamonds, economic behav-
iour is structured by social interactions and
relationships. Indeed, Durkheim’s thoughts
within his epitome Division of Labour, shares
sensibilities to this idea, noting that,
even where society rests wholly upon the div-
ision of labour, it does not resolve itself into a
myriad of atoms juxtaposed together,
between which only external and transitory
contact can be established. The members are
linked by ties that extend well beyond the
very brief moment when the act of exchange
is being accomplished. (Durkheim, 1984;
Granovetter, 2017)
Embeddedness works on the premise that
economic actions (players, clubs, countries and
federations) are impacted by: connections to
others, their position they occupy, and also by
the structure of the overall network. This idea
of embeddedness is contrary to the neo-classi-
cal frameworks dominant in economics, which
are based on utility maximisation and rational
atomised actors, placing great emphasis on
how position and structure constrain behaviour.
The idea of position is a central argument in this
paper. Ronald Burt (1992), in thinking about a
position in a network – especially in relation to
the advantage that it can create, coined the
term “structural hole”. For Burt, individual or
organisations with ties into multiple networks
that are otherwise unconnected enjoy a com-
petitive and strategic advantage. In such a situ-
ation, the said actor spans what Burt calls a
structural hole, thus controlling what is
flowing through the network. Being in such a
strategic potion allows them to exploit the
structural hole in the networks they join (Burt,
1992). Individuals are effectively brokers and
can thus leverage and trade off what is
flowing, be it money or information.
Football’s trade network has been seldom
researched in terms of world-systems or, for
that matter, through the principles of embedd-
edness. Hence, we address this by placing struc-
ture through networks at the centre of our
methodological approach, bringing these two
concepts together. Furthermore, as an extra
nuance, we explore these network structures
focusing on key emerging countries in football
trade, id est those countries which are growing
in statue as a force within the football market,
these include; China, Brazil, Turkey and Russia.
The rationale for this is two-fold. First, not only
do these countries feature as core blocks
within Kick et al. (2011) study, but they are all
ranked as highly significant internationally
trading countries within their respective foot-
ball confederations (FIFA, 2017a, 2017b,
2017c). Taking an exploratory approach, this
paper will identify if the football trade involving
the emerging markets can be stratified into
different positions, matching onto results
reported in the previous literature on world-
systems approach. In addition, network analysis
will provide fundamental network metrics
which will allow us to position football research
within the wider literature on trade. A key pre-
request for structural analysis of this kind is
noted by Borgatti and Halgin (2011), identifying
that prior to analysing a network, the boundary
must be defined, and, following the nominalist
view (Knoke & Yang, 2008), in this instance the
boundary of football’s emerging market trade
network (FEMTN) comprises of international
football trade concerning the aforementioned
countries. Thus, we can treat this as a whole
network for these countries, though it is
acknowledged this is an ego network of these
four counties from the larger global football
trade network.
Method and data
To investigate the FEMTN, we utilise Network
Analysis – often referred to as Social Network
Analysis (SNA). The essence of SNA can be
traced back to Georg Simmel ([1922] 1955]) in
his The Web of Group Affiliations, however, it
was social psychologist Jacob Moreno (1932,
1934) who first developed the sociogram –
what is now the classical visual representation
of networks. Yet, it was Cartwright and Harary
(1977) who gave the sociogram a solid ground-
ing in Graph Theory – which is now the norm in
today’s SNA. A network or graph describes a set
of elements, termed nodes, vertices or actors,
that are connected through interactions and
relationships, termed edges or ties (Vega-
Redondo, 2007). Following Wasserman and
Faust (2009) and De Benedictis, Nenci, Santoni,
Tajoli, and Vicarelli (2014) a graph is noted as
G = (V, L) compromised of a set of nodes V (or
vertices or actors) and a set of edges L (or ties
or links), or L∈V×V. In this paper we identify n
= 69 different countries involved in the
FEMTN, V = (1, 2, 3,… , 69) with 203 football
transfers (trade connections) between them,
thus L = (1, 2, 3,… , 203). By knowing who
trades with whom we are able to create a
network visualisation of the structure of these
trading patterns.
Moreover, as the edges follow the direction
of trade (otherwise referred to as arcs), from
exporting country i to importing country j,
then, Lij ∈ {0,1}, with Lij= 1 showing a trade
relationship and Lij= 0 where a trade relation-
ship does not exist. This can be represented in
an asymmetric adjacency matrix, A = n × n (n
representing the number of nodes in the
network). Hence, Lij in the adjacency matrix A
is not equal to Lji, or, the edge from country i
to j, does not necessarily imply an edge from
country j to i exists nor does it mean the weight
is equal if one does.
If we then account for the weight of the trade
relationship between i and j, and other relevant
information on the nodes and arcs then the
network can be noted as N = (G (V, L), W, P).
With W representing edge characteristics, such
as the value of the relationship and P includes
node specific information, in this instance the
country label following ISO 3 country codes. In
addition to the exogenous information for both
W and P, endogenous information can also be
included, mostly those associated with the topo-
logical properties of the node (country) within
the trade network structure. It is the topological
properties of the FEMTN that is of interest to this
paper and the following presents such. Follow-
ing previous work by Liu et al. (2016), all football
trade data for the 16/17 season was compiled
from Opta Sports’ transfer database soccerway.-
com. To validate the data, all observations were
corroborated with transfermarkt.com – another
industry provider of football transfer data, and
news outlets such as BBC sport, ESPN, The Tele-
graph and The Guardian. Network properties
were calculated and visualised using the
network software UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, &
Freeman, 2002) and Figure 1 was generated
using Gephi software (Bastian, Heymann, &
Jacomy, 2009). The circles represent countries
and the lines that join these countries are arcs
or edges, which represent a transaction. Further-
more, the edge/arc is also weighted here to
account for the volume of transactions
between two nodes, whilst the size of the
nodes represents how central they are, larger
being more central. In the following section, we
use this sociogram (Figure 1) as a visual guide
to exploring the network through various
graph metrics and network analysis.
Football’s emerging market trade
network properties
The most common and simplest endogenous
network properties are those associated with
centrality, which is a measure of how central a
country is within the trade network. Jackson
(2010) notes that there are four main measures
of how central a node or actor maybe, these
include; degree centrality (CD) which measures
a node’s connectedness to other nodes; close-
ness centrality (CC) a measure indicating how
easy a node can be reached by other nodes;
betweenness centrality (CB) a measure of the
nodes importance in terms of connecting
other nodes; we term the final type “centrality
power” which incorporates two related
measures, eigenvector centrality, (CE), and Bona-
cich centrality (CP), representing the impor-
tance, centrality and influential a node’s
neighbours are. Fundamentally, centrality
measures can identify those actors who hold
power and influence within networks, so these
measures are well placed to provide insight to
the structure of the trade network and the pos-
ition of certain countries within it. Furthermore,
it allows us, somewhat superficially, to explore
ideas of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985)
and positions of advantage such as structural
holes and brokerage (Burt, 1992). That is, these
measures will enable us to explore positions of
countries within our bounded network, allow-
ing us to interpret the position in relation to
the theoretical frameworks introduced earlier
in the paper. In the following section, we articu-
late our use of these centrality measures as they
are central to our arguments, we start with the
simplest measure degree centrality. Table 1
includes the results of the measures.
Degree centrality
Degree centrality is the simplest property of
network position for a node or, in our case,
trading country. Essentially, this metric
measures centrality based on the number of
connections a node has. Formally, the normal-




(N − 1) .
Normalising this measure is often used for com-
parisons of differing network size or time, and
although we do not use it for those purposes
here, it gives a better understanding of node
degree centrality in relation to the whole
FEMTN network; hence N – 1 (N representing
the total number of nodes in G). Moreover,
within a directed network, such as the FEMTN,
there are two measures of degree centrality;
in-degree – based on the number of arcs
flowing into a node, and out-degree – articulat-
ing the number of arcs exiting a node. There-
fore, in-degree, noted as
∑N
j=i
L ji , for the FEMTN
represents the total number of football
(player) imports (or purchases) of country i,
and out-degree, noted as
∑N
j=i
Lij , shows the
total number of football (player) exports (or










Not accounting for the weight of the ties,
Table 1 presents these results. Although the
emerging market countries will demonstrate
Figure 1. Trade map of FEMTN.
Table 1. Topological properties of the FEMTN.



















Size Efficiency Constraint K-Core Coordinator Gatekeeper Represent Consultant Liaison
ARG 0.059 0.029 0.36 0.389 0 0.152 -0.309 0.284 2.427 0.607 0.621 4 0 0 0 0 0
AUS 0.015 0.044 0.298 0.422 0 0.003 0.015 0 2.549 0.85 0.941 3 0 0 0 0 0
AUT 0.044 0 0.345 0.2 0 0.064 0 0.016 1.912 0.637 0.789 3 0 0 0 0 0
AZE 0.029 0 0.338 0.2 0 0.005 0 0.041 1.562 0.781 0.889 2 0 0 0 0 0
BEL 0.044 0.029 0.356 0.402 0 0.015 0.059 0.03 2.08 0.693 0.494 3 0 0 0 0 0
BGR 0.015 0.044 0.309 0.422 0 0.004 0.006 0.022 2.153 0.718 0.626 3 0 0 0 0 0
BIH 0.015 0 0.319 0.2 0 0.001 0 0.01 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
BLR 0.015 0.029 0.309 0.402 0 0.002 0.005 0.012 1.223 0.612 0.667 2 0 0 0 0 0
BOL 0.015 0.015 0.325 0.36 0 0.001 0.006 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
BRA 0.471 0.412 0.422 0.527 27.838 0.241 0.125 0.16 36.617 0.939 0.207 4 79 221 179 0 331
CHE 0.029 0.029 0.333 0.402 0 0.01 0.012 0.089 1.489 0.745 0.751 2 0 0 0 0 0
CHL 0.015 0.029 0.325 0.412 0 0.004 0.016 0.002 1.483 0.742 0.705 2 0 0 0 0 0
CHN 0.191 0.353 0.378 0.486 9.191 0.614 0.145 0.161 26.42 0.911 0.265 4 32 63 71 0 87
COL 0.029 0.015 0.343 0.36 0 0.01 0.004 0.01 1.458 0.729 0.915 2 0 0 0 0 0
CYP 0 0.015 0.2 0.391 0 0.001 0.005 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
CZE 0.044 0.029 0.34 0.402 0.02 0.038 0.017 0.002 2.093 0.698 0.57 3 0 0 0 1 0
DEU 0.059 0.044 0.36 0.433 0.02 0.141 0.181 0.197 2.82 0.705 0.397 4 1 0 0 0 0
DNK 0.029 0.015 0.329 0.384 0.02 0.018 0.007 -0.007 1.965 0.983 0.601 2 0 0 0 1 0
ECU 0.015 0 0.33 0.2 0 0.007 0 0.004 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
EGY 0.015 0 0.302 0.2 0 0.027 0 -0.035 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
ESP 0.044 0.044 0.34 0.433 0.02 0.163 0.434 0.326 2.712 0.678 0.416 4 1 0 0 0 0
ETH 0.015 0 0.313 0.2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
FIN 0 0.015 0.2 0.37 0 0.001 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
FRA 0.044 0.059 0.356 0.444 0 0.073 0.045 0.639 2.866 0.717 0.622 4 0 0 0 0 0
GBR 0.044 0.044 0.349 0.433 0.02 0.454 0.191 -0.252 2.653 0.663 0.609 4 1 0 0 0 0
GEO 0.015 0.015 0.327 0.366 0 0.002 0 0 1.723 0.862 0.587 2 0 0 0 0 0
GRC 0.029 0.044 0.329 0.433 0.02 0.066 0.1 0.017 2.757 0.689 0.483 4 1 0 0 0 0
HKG 0 0.015 0.2 0.345 0 0 -0.003 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
HRV 0.029 0.029 0.329 0.395 0.02 0.009 0.015 0.033 1.98 0.99 0.653 2 0 0 0 1 0
HUN 0.015 0.015 0.316 0.366 0 0.003 0 0.006 1.223 0.612 0.667 2 0 0 0 0 0
IND 0.015 0 0.33 0.2 0 0.001 0 0.001 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
IRN 0.044 0.015 0.356 0.384 0 0.005 0.012 0.045 2.095 0.698 0.623 3 0 0 0 0 0
IRQ 0.015 0 0.319 0.2 0 0 0 0.001 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
ISR 0.029 0.029 0.329 0.412 0.02 0.037 0.083 0.019 2.535 0.845 0.495 3 0 0 0 1 0
ITA 0.059 0.044 0.36 0.422 0.02 0.15 0.598 0.346 2.877 0.719 0.455 4 1 0 0 0 0
JPN 0.044 0.029 0.349 0.412 0.02 0.013 0.086 0.046 2.424 0.808 0.558 3 0 0 0 1 0
KAZ 0.015 0 0.313 0.2 0 0.002 0 0.018 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
(Continued )
Table 1. Continued.



















Size Efficiency Constraint K-Core Coordinator Gatekeeper Represent Consultant Liaison
KOR 0.029 0.029 0.333 0.389 0 0.008 -0.231 -0.006 1.659 0.83 0.566 2 0 0 0 0 0
KWT 0.015 0 0.302 0.2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
LVA 0.015 0 0.313 0.2 0 0.002 0 0.018 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
MAR 0.015 0 0.319 0.2 0 0 0 0.004 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
MDA 0 0.015 0.2 0.366 0 0.001 0.003 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
MEX 0.015 0.029 0.325 0.412 0 0.018 0.067 0.009 1.46 0.73 0.892 2 0 0 0 0 0
MLT 0 0.015 0.2 0.366 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
MNE 0.029 0 0.338 0.2 0 0 0 0.002 1.607 0.803 0.996 2 0 0 0 0 0
MYS 0.015 0.015 0.325 0.36 0 0 0.002 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
NLD 0.059 0.029 0.36 0.412 0.02 0.023 0.001 -0.007 2.611 0.653 0.666 4 1 0 0 0 0
NOR 0.015 0.029 0.316 0.393 0 0.004 -0.003 0.018 2.194 0.731 0.689 3 0 0 0 0 0
PER 0.015 0 0.33 0.2 0 0.001 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
POL 0.044 0.029 0.34 0.412 0.02 0.006 0.018 0.013 2.937 0.734 0.586 4 1 0 0 0 0
PRT 0.059 0.029 0.36 0.412 0.02 0.082 0.347 0.101 2.992 0.748 0.511 4 1 0 0 0 0
PRY 0 0.015 0.2 0.366 0 0.005 0.032 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
QAT 0.015 0.015 0.325 0.36 0 0.006 0.022 0.003 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
ROU 0.029 0 0.338 0.2 0 0.012 0 0.112 1.464 0.732 0.715 2 0 0 0 0 0
RUS 0.309 0.441 0.395 0.535 19.377 0.42 0.125 0.158 30.254 0.818 0.37 4 45 134 133 0 239
SAU 0.029 0 0.349 0.2 0 0.003 0 0.016 1.546 0.773 0.582 2 0 0 0 0 0
SRB 0.029 0.015 0.333 0.364 0 0.015 -0.001 0.141 1.218 0.609 0.672 2 0 0 0 0 0
SVK 0.015 0 0.319 0.2 0 0.002 0 0.021 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
SVN 0.029 0 0.338 0.2 0 0.004 0 0.036 1.44 0.72 0.686 2 0 0 0 0 0
SWE 0.044 0.015 0.34 0.384 0.02 0.024 0.052 0.028 2.289 0.763 0.534 3 0 0 0 1 0
THA 0.015 0.015 0.311 0.362 0 0.005 0.026 0.007 1.773 0.887 0.858 2 0 0 0 0 0
TUN 0.015 0 0.319 0.2 0 0.001 0 0.006 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
TUR 0.382 0.588 0.405 0.581 25.525 0.241 0.124 0.159 41.797 0.95 0.216 4 97 278 184 0 394
UAE 0.044 0.029 0.349 0.412 0.02 0.066 0.08 -0.008 2.382 0.794 0.451 3 0 0 0 1 0
UKR 0.029 0.029 0.329 0.395 0.02 0.008 0.014 0.067 1.987 0.993 0.993 2 0 0 0 1 0
URY 0.044 0.029 0.356 0.4 0 0.022 0.008 0.106 2.111 0.704 0.493 3 0 0 0 0 0
USA 0.015 0.015 0.325 0.36 0 0.006 0.004 0.003 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
UZB 0.015 0.015 0.309 0.364 0 0.005 0 0.015 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
VEN 0 0.015 0.2 0.366 0 0.001 0.007 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
higher in/out degree than other countries, we
can still derive some insightful information.
Firstly, based on out-degree, China is the least
central to the FEMTN network, with CCHNDout =
0.191 suggesting they sell the least players
within the network. More interestingly, the
selling trade flow (out-degree) shows Brazil to
be the most central CBRADout = 0.471, which is
larger than Turkey, CTURDout = 0.382, and Russia,
CRUSDout = 0.309, implying that Brazil is central to
player sales within the emerging markets. Argu-
ably, this aligns to footballs division of labour, as
Brazil has long been considered producers of
strong footballers in great quantities. Similarly,
within the buying flow, China is the least
central, CCHNDin = 0.353, although it is considerably
more than its in-degree, suggesting they con-
centrate on importing players over exporting
players, which is perhaps part of a wider strat-
egy. Unlike Brazil which is also central to the
buying flow of trade within the emerging
markets, CBRADin = 0.412. However, Turkey, C
TUR
Din =
0.588, is the most central to importing players
within the FEMTN, followed by Russia, CRUSDin =
0.441, suggesting Russia, and more so, Turkey
are influential in terms of acquiring players in
the FEMTN. Accepting that those with more
connections have more power (Newman,
2008), then Brazil and Turkey, therefore, have
the most seller and buyer power, respectively.
Within the emerging market’s nodes, that is
who our four countries are connected to
through trade, there are signs of other countries
taking central roles – albeit marginal to China,
Brazil, Russia and Turkey. For example, Table 1
shows Portugal, Netherlands, Italy Germany
and Argentina as all having the highest out-
degree centrality, CiDout = 0.059, followed by a
group of 12 countries (Uruguay, United Arab
Emirates, Sweden, Poland, Japan, Iran, France,
England, Spain, Czech Republic, Austria and
Belgium) with an out-degree of CiDout = 0.044.
This identifies two influential groups of
countries, predominantly European, who are
exporting players to the FEMTN, potentially
taking advantage of the emerging markets foot-
ball talent (resource). Conversely, there are less
countries purchasing players from emerging
market’s with France taking a prominent
central position CFRADin = 0.059, followed by other
European countries Bulgaria, Germany, Spain,
England, Greece and Italy, with an in-degree,
CiDin = 0.044. Again, it is the predominantly Euro-
pean countries who demonstrate a central role
with the FEMTN. Seemingly, the top-5 footbal-
ling countries globally, England, Spian,
Germany, Italy and France, are consistently
central to both flows of trade for the FEMTN,
regardless of who is exploiting whom, it is
clear that these countries have strategic pos-
itions within the network. That said, further
research is needed, looking at the whole
global football trade network to understand
these strategic roles further. However, at this
stage we see a complex structure emerging of
trade between European traditional football
trade markets and their relationship with emer-
ging markets.
Closeness centrality
Another commonly observed endogenous
nodal property is closeness centrality, which
refers to topological distance, or how close a
node is to all other nodes. This is an important
concept as it shows how close countries are to
each other, based on trade. Generally, distance
in a network relates to the number of steps
node i requires to reach another node j, with
the minimum path distance between i and j
termed the geodesic distance. Inversing the
average geodesic distance provides a proximity
measure, with high scores showing nodes are





with Dij representing the geodesic distance
between i and j. If each country i in the
FEMTN is connected to all others, Dij would
equal 1, hence the less country i is directly con-
nected to nodes the smaller their closeness cen-
trality. However, akin to degree centrality within
a directed network, the geodesic distance for i
and j may differ depending on the nodal
order, for example, may not equal D ji . There-










Out-closeness, or CiCout represents distance from
export partners (buyers) and in-closeness, or
CiCin represents distance from import partners
(sellers).
Closeness centrality garners similar results as
degree centrality but offers further support to
our propositions within this paper. Brazil, CBRACout
= 0.422 is most central to exporting players,
with Turkey (CTURCin = 0.581) most central to
importing players, based on proximity.
However, China becomes substantially more
central CCHNCout = 0.378 and C
CHN
Cin = 0.486, with a
significant increase in centrality for the selling
flow. Thus, what this demonstrates is that if
China wanted to increase its out-degree central-
ity, it has the network capability to do so. That
said, the emerging market’s alters have very
similar out-closeness generally CiCout > 0.3,
suggesting that China does not have much of
a strategic position within the exporting
market, but does have the network capacity to
reverse this.
Within the buying market, however, there
appears to be a group of European countries
taking a more influential position than the
rest, mainly France, CFRACin = 0.444 followed by
England, Spain, Germany and Greece, CiCin =
0.433, and Italy, CITACin = 0.422. Very similar to
degree centrality, the European elite – those
countries with the top-5 leagues (Deloitte,
2017) – have an influential position on the
FEMTN. This implies a European elite has the
shortest paths – or are close – to the majority
of other FEMTN countries, meaning they are
able to take advantage of this when purchasing
talent (assets). This may go some way to
explaining why Europe is considered the most
important part of the global football industry.
Betweenness centrality
Betweenness centrality is an indicator of pres-
tige, referring to the extent to which node i is
involved in the geodesic distance of two uncon-
nected nodes, j and k. It is therefore essential to
the indirect link between j and k. This form of
centrality has important strategic implications
that can be exploited and leveraged for advan-
tage. Thus, the betweenness centrality of
country i represents the proportion of geodesic
distances i is involved in indirectly connecting
country j and k (Vega-Redondo, 2007). A stan-
dardised measure based on Freeman’s (1978)








CiB represents betweenness, CB, for actor i, with
D jk noting the sum of geodesic distance
between alters j and k, and Dijk noting those
geodesic distances between j and k involving
i. Thus, a high CB measure suggests country i
trades with more unconnected trade partners,
which can provide a strategic role within the
network (structural hole). As the nodes are
already ordered, then this measure does not
provide separate in/out measures (Wasserman
& Faust, 2009).
Brazil and Turkey’s apparent dominance
within the FEMTN is more visible when export-
ing thus measure. Indeed, these two countries
scores demonstrate the highest betweenness
centrality out of the emerging market countries,
CBRAB = 27.838 and C
TUR
B = 25.525. This demon-
strates the powerful position these countries
take within this network, as they are trading
with unconnected partners, which means they
occupy somewhat of a structural hole and act
as a broker within the network (Burt, 1992).
Interestingly, China’s betweenness is compara-
tively low CCHNB = 9.191, meaning it trades
more with connected partners, reducing their
importance within the network. This may evi-
dence China’s football strategy; that is, to
create and maintain relations with well-con-
nected or central countries. However, this may
be considered counterproductive in that it
weakens China’s position in terms of leverage,
at least following Burt’s (1992) supposition.
Whilst it is expected that the emerging
market countries have exponential values to
other countries, there is a group of 16 countries,
CiB = 0.02, who are positioned between two
unconnected trade partners – demonstrating
that the FEMTN (hence China, Brazil, Turkey
and Russia), are reliant on these countries to
connect to the network, collectively providing
influence and power. This not only includes
the already established and dominant European
countries but also, United Arab Emirates, Japan
and Israel, among others. Again, this indicates
each of these countries has an advantaged pos-
ition in the network as they connect uncon-
nected nodes.
Structural holes
As previously mentioned in this paper, the idea
of betweenness underpins Burt’s (1992) postula-
tion of structural holes, which also forms part of
Granovetter’s structural embeddness frame-
work. Burt proposed two extensions to the
idea of betweenness; effect size and constraint.
Effect size is based on the premise that if a
node’s alters are connected, then the node’s
connections are redundant. For example, if
node i is connected to node j and q – (i,j) and
(i,q), – but node j is connected to q ( j,q) then
i’s connection to j is redundant. Essentially
effect size is based on the number of redundant
ties an ego has. Whilst Burt (1992) provides
detailed commentary, Borgatti (1997) supposed
that redundancy is merely the number of alters
a node has, minus the average degree of alters
not including ties to that particular node, and




where t represents the number of ties in the
network (not counting ties to ego) and n
denotes the number of nodes (excluding ego),
which means effect size can be written;
EffectSize = n− 2t
n
.
Furthermore, as this measure is contingent
on degree, it can be normalised by dividing
the effect size by the number of ties a node
has, leading to what is termed efficiency (Bor-
gatti et al., 2002; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
As a result of the boundary set from this
study, the FEMTN efficiency metric is of more
interest here, as naturally, the emerging
market countries will have larger effect sizes.
Also noteworthy, those with 100% efficiency
are those peripheral countries, with only 1
trade partner which is again a result of the
boundary construction, not necessarily exploita-
ble position in the network.
What these measures do show us is that
Turkey, China, Brazil and Russia are in dominant
positions with >90% efficiency, suggesting the
majority of their trade partners do not trade
with each other. It must be noted this is
expected considering the boundary set for this
network was China, Brazil Turkey and Russia,
therefore we do not account for trade
between other countries in this study. Neverthe-
less, out of the emerging market countries,
Russia has the weakest position with 81%
efficiency, demonstrating that 19% of Russia’s
football trade relations are redundant – as
their trade partners also trade together, which
is considerably lower than, Turkey, China and
Brazil all with >90% efficiency. Therefore,
Turkey, China and Brazil are trading with part-
ners who do not trade with each other
meaning, Turkey, China and Brazil are more
integral to their trade partners, giving them a
slight advantage over Russia. In other words,
China, Turkey and Brazil occupy structural
holes within the network (Burt, 1992) meaning
they have an exploitable position over Russia
because their trade partners are more reliant
on maintaining trade relations. Interestingly,
Argentina (60%), Austria (63%), Bulgaria (61%),
Hungry (61%), Serbia (60%) and Netherlands
(65%) demonstrate some of the weakest pos-
itions as nearly 40% of their connections are
redundant. This indicates these countries trade
with countries who also trade with each other,
meaning they have little leverage and are
open to being exploited by other countries
through paying inflated prices for players or
selling players under value.
Burt’s constraint idea is also concerned with
the idea of redundancy and relates to how con-
strained a node is by the connection between
alters in a node’s neighbourhood. In other
words, i is constrained when i has invested
time and energy connecting with j, but then j
is surrounded by few structural holes, in that, j
has a relationship with q in i’s neighbourhood.
Thus, i does not have an exploitable position,
as, if i disconnects from j, then j is still reachable
by q. Mathematically, Burt’s (1992, p. 55)
Equation 2.4 is as follows:





, i = q = j,
Pij relates to the proportional strength of i’s
relationship with j, and Piq denotes the strength
of i’s relationship with another q where Pqj
depicts the strength of q’s relationship with j.
Here, the lower the constraint measure the
less connected a node’s alters are, or in this
instance the less alternative trading partners.
Accordingly, a country who is highly con-
strained means their trading partners are also
trading, reducing the strategic position.
Indeed, those who are totally constrained, 1,
are the peripheral countries who had 100%
efficiency, again this is due to the boundary
network set.
Again, similar to efficiency, Turkey, Conij =
0.216, and Brazil, Conij = 0.207, have the most
exploitable position as they are least con-
strained by their trade partners, compared to
China, Conij = 0.258, and Russia Conij = 0.35.
This implies Turkey and Brazil trade with
countries that have multiple structural holes,
unlike Russia, which trades with countries with
fewer structural holes. This once again high-
lights Russia’s lack of strategic position within
the FEMTN. Interestingly, looking at the Euro-
pean elite, Germany Conij = 0.398, Spain Conij
= 0.416 and Italy Conij = 0.455 have the most
exploitable position Conij = 0.398, and are
much less constrained than their counterparts,
England Conij = .609 and France Conij = 0.622.
So whilst England and France show to be
central to the FEMTN they do not have exploita-
ble positions within the network – following
Burt’s thought on structural holes.
Eigenvector centrality
Proposed by Bonacich (1972a, 1972b) eigenvec-
tor centrality extends the notion of closeness
centrality, however, this focuses on the close-
ness centrality (or geodesic distance) of node
i’s alters. Thus, it is a more sophisticated
measure of closeness centrality as it assumes
not all connections are equal – that is, connect-
ing to an influential node (country) j provides
node (country) i influence within the network,








CiE represents the eigenvector, CE , for country i
where l is a constant – relating to the largest
eigenvalue in the adjacency matrix. This
measure shows the proportional centrality of
country i to the average of i’s neighbourhood
(connected alters), inferring that those
connected to influential or powerful nodes are
themselves influential.
Based on this notion of influential power
within the network, China, CCHNE = 0.617, is the
most powerful. So whilst China has continu-
ously shown a weaker position within the
FEMTN based on their topological properties,
they are connected to the more central
countries than any other in the network.
Russia, have a moderate eigenvector centrality,
CiE = 0.42, compared to, Brazil and Turkey, C
i
E =
0.241, who are not connected to other influen-
tial countries and therefore have low eigenvec-
tor centralities. This suggests that while China
has not created an important position within
the network, it has connected itself to the
most central countries to garner power and
influence. Interestingly, England occupies an
advantageous position within the network
CGBRE = 0.454, as it is connected to strongly con-
nected others. Therefore, England is powerful
within the FEMTN because it is connected to
other high-trading countries.
Bonacich power
Whilst eigenvector centrality focuses on a
node’s alters’ closeness centrality, Bonacich
(1987) further proposed the notion of “depen-
dency” referring to a node who’s alters have a
small degree – rather than a large degree –
has more power, because their alters are depen-
dent on that connection. So based on this
premise, if country i is connected to country j
who is not well connected then country i is
more powerful because country j is dependent
on i. Generally, Bonacich’s notation can be





CiP represents the centrality power, CP , of
country i, with a being an arbitrary standardis-
ing constant. b represents a positive or negative
parameter – positive measures i’s power based
on well-connected alters (similar to that of
eigenvector centrality) and negative measures
i’s power based on the dependency of low-con-
nected alters. Thus, we followed the latter to
establish which countries are most powerful in
the FEMTN following Bonacich’s work on
dependency. However, the difficulty or
problem with Bonacich’s parameter b is that it
is researcher assigned (Scott, 2017); therefore
we set the b value as 1/(n – 1) following Borgatti
et al. (2002), that is 1/69 = 0.01470588, and
because we are interested in who is powerful
based on dependency then we assign
−0.01470588 as the b value. To follow the direc-
tion, the measure is worked out based on in-
degree and out-degree – that is who is connect-
ing weakly connected nodes from buying (in-
degree) or selling (out-degree).
With regards to in-degree, Argentina, CARGPin =
−0.309, is the weakest country in the network in
relation to exporting players, because their
trade partners all have high in-degree and are
therefore buying players elsewhere. Hence,
Argentina’s selling power is low as their trade
partners are not dependent upon them.
However, this shifts when buying players,
CARGPout = 0.284, suggesting their trade partners
have low out-degree and therefore are more
dependent on Argentina to sell players. In
terms of selling power within the network, Euro-
pean countries again demonstrate their
influence, with Italy CITAPin = 0.598, Spain C
ESP
Pin =
0.434 and Portugal CPRTPin = 0.347 having highly
dependent alters, meaning they are connected
to countries with a low number of trade part-
ners to buy players from (in-degree). Arguably,
Italy is an important node due to the country
also having relative power CARGPout = 0.346 in
terms of buying power, as they are connected
to countries with a low number of trade part-
ners to sell player to (out-degree). Furthermore,
France CFRAPout = 0.639, takes the most dominant
position in terms of buying power, so their
trade partners are reliant on their relationship
with France to sell players, id est, they have
minimal trade partners to sell to. Interestingly,
England demonstrates the weakest position
within the network regarding buyer power;
indicating England’s trade partners have mul-
tiple trade partners they sell players to,
meaning they are not reliant on their trade
relationship with England. This opens England
up to exploitation, in that it can be leveraged
economically for football talent, as trade part-
ners can leverage England’s weak position.
Sub-groups and world systems
The measures of centrality previously discussed
in this paper are fundamentally about a
countries position in the network and in that
sense can be thought of as operating at the
micro level of the network. However, as demon-
strated by previous research (see Snyder & Kick,
1979; and Kick et al., 2011) the actors (nodes) in
a network, in this case countries, can be
grouped together based on trading patterns.
Essentially, regions and sub-groups within a
network identify interconnected groups of
nodes that can represent the underlying struc-
ture to the network. Indeed, this can occur at
varying degrees; such as a clique – which is
the strictest form of sub-group, as it requires
each node to be connected to one another.
There are multiple, less stringent, conceptualis-
ations, n-cliques, n-clans, k-plexes – which all
take a bottom-up approach (Hanneman &
Riddle, 2005) – which focus on the network
from the beginning, or, evolving/emerging
from a set of nodes tightly interconnected.
However, they all have lesser stringent con-
ditions. One of the most basic approaches to
this is to partition the network based on
differing densities, or degree, such as k-core
which allows nodes to be involved in a clique
even though they may not have to connections
to every other node. Fundamentally, this par-
titions nodes are based on k degree. Rather
than provide statistical metrics here, we visual-
ise it in Figure 2.
The FEMTN has three groups of countries
within the network. Firstly, there is a central
group of countries, the core, naturally made
up of the four ego’s, China, Brazil, Turkey,
Russia, as well as – and most interesting here
– those central European countries, Spain,
Italy, England, France, Germany, Portugal, Neth-
erland, Poland, Greece, along with Argentina.
These countries are interlinked but also link to
other groups, such as the semi-periphery, that
is those countries which trade with the core
countries, but not the periphery. This is made
up of Middle Eastern countries – like Saudi
Arabia, Israel, Azerbaijan and Iran – Asian
countries, such as Korea (South), Japan, and
Thailand, South American countries Chile,
Mexico and Columbia, as well as, other Euro-
pean countries, such as Sweden, Switzerland,
Denmark, Czech Republic and Norway. The
final group – the periphery – represents the
outer layer countries who only trade with the
core, and not the other members of the periph-
ery. This is generally made up of countries
where football is less developed, such as,
Egypt, Qatar, United States of America, Kazakh-
stan, Iraq, Ethiopia, Latvia, among others.
Interestingly, using k-core to partition the
FEMTN reveals a world-systems network that
is comparable with the output of Kick et al.
(2011), and the ideas of Wallerstein (1974a;
1974b) which demonstrated that developed
core nations exploit underdeveloped periph-
eral countries. Whilst we do not provide the
same level of analysis as Kick et al., who
utilise a more sophisticated block modelling
approach, we nevertheless assert that in
general those countries where the football
market is more developed, including the
emerging markets, countries form a core
which ultimately use their position within the
network to exploit less developed countries
(in a football sense).
Brokerage
Since the k-core produces categorical data, this
allows us to investigate brokerage of the emer-
ging market countries within the FEMTN. Along
with structural holes, Burt (1992) also used
brokerage to understand how an actor is
embedded within a network; the notion is
similar to betweenness in that it focuses on an
actor’s role in connecting two unconnected
actors. Similarly, Gould and Fernandez (1989)
also looked at the brokerage but focused on
an actor’s role within its neighbourhood or
between groups. In doing so, they provide 5
measures based on the role i plays in connect-
ing j and k, depending on the groups these
nodes belong. Their measures count how
many times i is a broker to j and k when: all
nodes belong to the same group ( j = i = k) –
known as Coordinator; i is not part of the
same group but j and k are ( j = k ≠ i) – known
as Consultant; j is not part of the same group
but i and k are ( j ≠ i = k) – known as Gatekeeper;
k is not part of the same group but i and j are ( j
= i≠ k) – known as Representative; and when all
nodes belong to a different group ( j≠ i≠ k) –
known as Liasion. For this analysis, we used
the categorical data provided by the k-core
analysis.
Whilst there are more sophisticated
measures, we simply use the count of each
time a country acts as a broker. Table 1 presents
the scores. Out of the emerging market
countries, Turkey and Brazil act as a broker
more so than China and Russia in each scenario.
In terms of the coordinator role, Turkey brokers
trade relations 97 times within the network,
implying they – along with Brazil (79) – are
the main brokers within the core. Once more,
this identifies Turkey and Brazil being the
most central and influential countries in the
network. Indeed, Brazil and Turkey broker
more relations connecting each of the groups;
Turkey plays the gatekeeper role 278 times
and Brazil 221, connecting the (semi) periphery
groups to the core and alternatively connecting
the core to the (semi) periphery through the
representative role. More importantly, the two
countries are essential in connecting the periph-
ery to the semi-periphery, playing the liaison
role 394 (Turkey) and 331 (Brazil) times, respect-
ively. Given China’s rise in terms of football, and
their vision for its future, it is surprising that
China does not have a more influential role,
having minimal brokerage compared to
Turkey and Brazil. This probably reflects on the
immaturity of China’s football strategy com-
pared to the other countries under
investigation.
Discussion
Evidently, applying network analysis to the foot-
ball trade network, such as the emerging
markets, yields some interesting insights. At
Figure 2. K-core of the football’s emerging markets trade network.
the very basic level – such as (in)out-degree – it
is clear Brazil and Turkey have distinct roles
within the network, Brazil predominantly sells
players and Turkey predominantly buys
players. Although they are both central in
terms of selling and buying, this arguably
follows Heckscher–Ohlin theorem in that,
Brazil are exporting a labour-intensive product
– footballing talent. Interestingly, however, fol-
lowing the same logic, China or Russia would
represent the capital rich countries and there-
fore would be expected to be integral to the
buying market, yet this is Turkey. Though this
makes more sense from a world-systems
approach, in that, Turkey being the most devel-
oped football country (out of China, Russia and
Brazil) exploits the less football developed
emerging countries China, Russia and Brazil
(Wallerstein, 1974a, 1974b). Further to this,
when applying k-core to the FEMTN, it identifies
sub-groups akin to that of world-systems, very
similar to the core, semi-periphery and periph-
ery findings of Snyder and Kick (1979) and
Kick et al. (2011). Therefore, showing how foot-
ball trade follows a similar global structure to
other relations as normal trade, diplomatic
relations and military alliances, supporting
Granovetter’s (1985, 2017) embeddedness argu-
ment. Indeed, this needs to be further explored
within the football transfer market, and future
research should focus on advanced network
analysis such as block modelling and equival-
ence analysis in-line with Kick et al. (2011)
extensive work.
China’s role – or lack of – within the FEMTN is
somewhat surprising, given the emphasis on
their football strategy and football investment.
However, this is a potential result of their strat-
egy of investing – potentially over investing – in
European football. This is evident through their
superior eigenvector score, showing they are
well connected to other well-connected or
central countries. Whilst this can provide
power as they are connected to well-connected
(powerful) countries, it means they lack exploi-
table advantageous positions such as being
connected to less-connected (weak) countries,
which are mainly occupied by Brazil and
Turkey. Thus Brazil and Turkey derive power
by developing dependency through trading
with poorly connected countries, whereas
China garner power through trading with well-
connected countries. Perhaps this is a conse-
quence of a strategic policy to grow the game
internally. Consequently, their investment in
creating and maintaining strategic connections
with central countries has resulted in neglecting
other, arguably more exploitable, positions in
the network, such as brokerage (Burt, 1992).
That said, China’s strategy is not due to lack of
access to the network, they have the capacity
to change their position, as they are central
from a closeness perspective, meaning they
have the proximity to poorly connected
countries. If they were to do so this would dras-
tically improve their leverage within the global
transfer market.
Brazil and Turkey have clearly adopted a
different strategy to China, creating powerful
and influential positions within the FEMTN,
especially in relation to occupying structural
holes, meaning they broker the majority of
relations throughout the network, aligning to
Burt’s (1992) argument. Especially in terms of
their brokerage roles of not only connecting
the core (coordinator) but more importantly
connecting the periphery to the semi-periphery
(liason), following Gould and Fernandez (1989).
Therefore, they have very strategic roles provid-
ing power and influence over the different
groups within the network. This may go some
way to explain their rise as global football
powerhouses, which if they further exploit
their positions they can dominate the emerging
markets.
The power and influence of European
countries are evident, especially the top-5
leagues, England, France, Italy, Germany and
Spain (Deloitte, 2017). However, they all have
interchangeable advantageous positions
throughout the network. For example, taking
the traditional view of power being inferred
by being connected to high-trading countries
(eigenvector centrality), England has the most
powerful position. Yet akin to China, this is
somewhat counterproductive for England as
they are highly constrained (Burt, 1992),
because they trade with high-trading countries,
meaning their partners also trade with each
other, reducing England’s power – as less of
the partners need England to trade. Indeed,
England is considered the nucleus of European
football (Deloitte, 2017), however, this finding
suggests if this was to change, England
would not hold a very exploitable position
within emerging markets. This is further com-
pounded taking the alternative view that
power comes from trading with low-trading
countries (Bonacich, 1987) – because they are
more dependent on maintaining that connec-
tion, thus exploitable. England is very weak,
mainly because not many of their trading part-
ners are reliant on their relationship, meaning
England are susceptible to being exploited
themselves – which may explain the rise in
transfer expenditure of top-flight English
clubs, which is considerably more than the
other top-5 European leagues (Deloitte, 2017).
To this end, English clubs should concentrate
their efforts on acquiring talent from less
powerful countries, similar to that of France,
Spain and Portugal, whose trading partners
are reliant on their trade, thus reducing the
likelihood of exploitation.
Nevertheless, the continuing importance of
the European elite, such as England, Spain and
France within FEMTN is likely to be bound-up
in colonial history, as well as language, culture
and prevailing norms, demonstrating an empiri-
cal example of Granovetter’s (1985, 2017)
embeddedness. This structure provides trust
throughout the network – that is, emerging
markets trust the European elite in trade deals.
In a similar vein, the football transfer network
is embedded in various other network struc-
tures: sporting, industrial, institutional and pol-
itical. For example, China’s reliance on
powerful footballing trade partners for their
talent supply-chain may reflect their state
backed football strategy.
From a management perspective, it is appar-
ent countries need to be conscious of the
investment/recruitment strategies influence on
network structure and position. For example,
Russian professional clubs have repeatedly
demonstrated a predisposition towards
signing Brazilian players, while its own domestic
talent has evidently not been inclined to move
overseas. Whilst in China, the government has
significantly restricted the flow of overseas
players into the country at the same time as
encouraging young domestic players to move
overseas to gain experience. Additionally,
identification, selection and maintenance of
footballing resource supply-chain, are impor-
tant considerations industry leaders need to
be aware of, especially in terms of over reliance
on important and influential countries.
Concluding Remarks
Whilst we have sought to capture and present
the dynamic nature of the football player trans-
fer network in this paper, such an analysis is
inevitably somewhat static in nature. Undertak-
ing further work on a longitudinal basis would
partly address this, and provide insight to
understand how such networks evolve and
change over time. That said, we have presented
an exploratory, and to some degree, within
sport management literature, a novel investi-
gation into the football transfer from a trade
network perspective, set in the context of econ-
omic sociology. Whilst there are several limit-
ations in the approach adopted by this paper,
not least, the boundary set for the network is
based on four countries; we have shown how
the position within the football trade network
can be exploited, thus clubs, countries and in
some cases governments can be strategic in
their footballing endeavours.
We demonstrate that the football transfer
network follows a similar structure to that of
normal trade, political and international
relations. However, future research should focus
on the whole network global transfer market to
provide better insight to the network structure
and topological properties of countries, to estab-
lish if the world-systems perspective also holds
true – ideally using blockmodeling or similar
equivalence methods. Similarly, a direct follow-
up study should analyse the relationship
between network position and football talent
investment, ideally at a club level. This can help
ascertain if network positions can lead to a ten-
dency to be exploitedwithin the football transfer
market, as well as providing much needed
insight into strategic alliances between football
clubs internationally and/or domestically.
As well as functional applications, (social)
network analysis can also be used for more criti-
cal applications such as, understanding the role
that countries from Africa or South America
play within the overall network; especially as
migration or muscle drain is a major concern
for the development of their internal football
structures.
In practical terms, it is important that officials
within the football industry acknowledge and
embrace the need to adopt appropriate
approaches to managing with networks. This
not only implies a need to understand the con-
nected, embedded nature of transfer activity, it
also suggests the need to develop competence
in the field. For example, issues of partner identifi-
cation, acquisition and management would
appear to be an imperative. Similarly, the signifi-
cance of boundary management, collaborating
to compete and creating sustainable labour
supply-chains are pertinent outcomes of this
research. Finally, researchers and practitioners
will hopefully find use in the methods and
findings from this paper to understand how
clubs and countries can use tradepartners advan-
tageously for leverage and potentially, growth.
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